How do organized interests value institutional power in American legislatures? I examine how campaign contributors respond to different forms of procedural authority in U.S. state legislatures, focusing on the relationship between campaign contributions and institutional leadership. I begin by unpacking a widely used measure of influence—"committee assignment power"—and show that its apparent relationship with campaign contributions is highly composition-sensitive and driven by a small number of states and legislators. Comparing models across institutional contexts, I demonstrate that the explanatory weight of assignment power shifts toward leadership offices such as the Speaker and Senate President, suggesting that donors are not rewarding assignment authority in isolation. Linking these findings to Anzia and Jackman's (2013) coding of procedural powers, I show that campaign contributions are most strongly associated with agenda-setting and gatekeeping authority. Contributions flow primarily to a bundled package of procedural powers that structure the legislative process rather than to any single institutional lever.

When do enduring relationships between organized interests and politicians form, and does the timing of initial investment relative to electoral viability shape how durable those relationships become? This paper argues that pre-primary donors, or "seed interests," who commit resources before viability is established behave as long-term investors, whereas "bandwagon interests," who enter after a primary victory, are motivated by access to a likely officeholder. Drawing on PAC contributions to open-seat primary winners in freshman cohorts from the 102nd to the 115th Houses, I examine three dimensions of relationship durability: how long support is sustained, the likelihood of stopping contributions, and the likelihood of resuming support after a lapse. Seed interests support legislators for more election cycles, are 13% less likely to stop giving, and are more likely to resume contributions after lapses, with the strongest effects in open-seat races. These findings show that even under uncertainty, early giving reflects selective, investment-driven behavior rather than access-seeking.

I examine whether legislators seek committee assignments whose jurisdictions align with their seed donors' interests. I define committee jurisdiction in two ways: first, by examining donations to committee members in the previous election cycle, and second, by identifying the committees to which bills on specific policy issues were referred. To test whether legislators join committees aligned with their seed donors' interests, I analyze match rates between members' seed donor interests and committee affiliations over their careers. I also estimate a survival model, treating placement on a seed interest-related committee as the event, and compare the time it takes for members to join a seed donor interest committee versus a bandwagon interest committee. I find that most legislators secure a position on a seed donor-related committee by their fourth cycle, with Republicans doing so earlier and at higher rates than Democrats.

Are donors responding to candidate viability signals, or are they generating them? Using open seat House primaries from 2000 to 2022, I classify donors as access-oriented, ideological, or local/civic based on prior FEC giving history, and examine whether the composition of early money—contributions made before polling or major endorsements exist—predicts primary outcomes above and beyond total dollars raised. Within-race comparisons with race fixed effects isolate variation in donor composition across candidates competing in the same primary. I find that candidates receiving a higher share of ideological early money win primaries at higher rates conditional on total fundraising, suggesting that donor type confers legitimacy and momentum independent of resource levels. These results challenge purely access-seeking models of donor behavior and point toward an emergent role for affectively and ideologically motivated small-dollar donors in shaping who enters and succeeds in congressional politics.

Why do individual donors give money to congressional candidates outside their own state or district? The dominant rationalist account holds that campaign contributions are investments in legislative access or policy outcomes, implying donors should prefer candidates who can plausibly deliver returns. Yet the dramatic growth of out-of-state small-dollar giving to congressional races defies this logic: geographically distant donors cannot extract access, and their collective policy demands are often incoherent. Drawing on the Cooperative Election Study (CES) from 2006 to 2024, I argue that the nationalization of congressional small-dollar giving is affectively driven. Using validated donation data linked to racial resentment and gender hostility batteries fielded consistently across CES waves, I show that out-of-state congressional donors are distinguished not by ideological extremity or strong policy preferences but by elevated affective grievance. I further leverage variation across election cycles to identify political shocks—including the 2010 Tea Party mobilization, the 2016 Trump candidacy, the 2020 Black Lives Matter protests, and the 2022 Dobbs decision—as events that selectively recruit affectively motivated donors into the nationalized giving pool. My findings challenge access-seeking models of campaign finance and suggest that legislators reliant on nationalized small-dollar fundraising are beholden to a constituency defined less by policy demands than by emotional grievance, with implications for legislative behavior, representation, and the internal organization of Congress.

Why do some legislators form durable bipartisan coalitions while others remain locked in partisan silos? This paper argues that the answer lies, in part, in the structure of legislators' pre-primary donor networks. I introduce the concept of seed donors, defined as organized interests that commit resources before a candidate's electoral viability is established, and construct a Donor Compatibility Index (DCI) measuring pairwise overlap in seed-donor portfolios for all House legislator dyads in the 115th and 116th Congresses (2017–2021). Because seed donors are investment-driven and selective, their overlap between two legislators constitutes a stronger signal of shared policy alignment than generic donor overlap does. I test whether DCI predicts bipartisan cosponsorship tie formation. Results show that DCI is positively associated with bipartisan cosponsorship across all specifications, surviving the inclusion of legislator fixed effects, ideological distance controls, and a horse-race comparison against total donor overlap. The association is stronger for cross-party dyads than for same-party dyads, and is most pronounced in organized-interest-intensive domains such as agriculture and energy, with no detectable effect in social policy. The findings suggest that the pre-primary financial environment leaves a durable imprint on the architecture of legislative cooperation, and that the investment-access distinction in campaign finance research has empirical consequences as well as theoretical ones.

Do legislators' policy agendas become more consistent as they accumulate time in office? This paper tests whether legislative tenure predicts increasing consistency in members of Congress's substantive policy focus, distinguishing a maturation account—legislators genuinely narrow and stabilize their agendas as they gain seniority, expertise, and institutional position—from a selection account, in which legislators who already had narrow, consistent agendas were more electable, so cross-sectional differences between junior and senior members reflect who survives rather than what happens to individuals over a career. Using bill-sponsorship data classified into policy topic domains for members of the U.S. House, I construct two within-legislator measures of agenda consistency across consecutive Congresses: a Herfindahl-Hirschman concentration index capturing the breadth of a legislator's issue portfolio, and a cosine-similarity measure capturing whether legislators return to the same topics term over term rather than merely narrowing to a different topic each time. I embed both in legislator fixed-effects panel models, which isolate within-person change in consistency from the confound of who remains in office. As a secondary test, I examine whether topical consistency corresponds to ideological consistency, measured via Nokken-Poole ideal points, asking whether "agenda consistency" is a single underlying disposition or several loosely coupled tendencies.