Research
Job Market Paper
Whose Champion? Investigating Legislators’ Priorities in Committee Hearings
Abstract
Whose interests do legislators advocate for in lawmaking? The literature has extensively explored the incentives shaping legislators' behavior, with particular focus on the roles of donors and constituents. This study specifically examines the influence of early donors ("seed interests") on legislators' actions during committee hearings. By analyzing transcripts from committee hearings in the 107th to 117th sessions of the House of Representatives using supervised and semi-supervised topic models, and cross-validating the results with an AI assistant, I investigate whether legislators prioritize their seed interests over those of their constituents or largest donors, especially in relation to the electoral conditions under which these relationships were formed. The findings reveal that legislators are more likely to advocate for seed donors when they secured their seat through open-seat primaries followed by non-competitive general elections. In contrast, legislators show less consistent support for seed donors when elected through more competitive routes, where they are incentivized to appeal to the broader electorate. These results highlight a new type of interest group-legislator relationship that may help explain legislators' lawmaking behavior.Papers Under Review
Bundled Power: How Donors Value Procedural Powers in U.S. State Legislatures
Revise & Resubmit, Legislative Studies Quarterly
Abstract
I examine the extent to which interest groups attend to institutional rules and procedures of lawmaking by assessing how they reward legislators with different types of procedural authority. I begin by unpacking a widely used measure of influence --- ``committee assignment power'' --- and show that its apparent effect on campaign contributions is composition-sensitive, driven by a few states and legislators. When compared across models, the explanatory weight of assignment power shifts towards leadership offices such as the Speaker and Senate President, suggesting that donors are not valuing assignment authority in isolation. Linking this analysis to Anzia and Jackman’s (2013) coding of procedural powers, I demonstrate that what looks like donor responsiveness to assignment power is in fact most strongly tied to agenda-setting and gatekeeping tools. Contributions flow primarily to a bundled package of leadership powers that structure lawmaking, rather than to a single procedural lever.First to Come, Last to Leave: An Analysis on Seed Donors and Politicians
Under Review
Abstract
When do enduring relationships between organized interests and politicians form, and does the timing of initial investment relative to electoral viability shape how durable those relationships become? This paper argues that pre-primary donors, or “seed interests,” who commit resources before viability is established behave as long-term investors, whereas “bandwagon interests,” who enter after a primary victory, are motivated by access to a likely officeholder. Drawing on PAC contributions to open-seat primary winners in freshman cohorts from the 102nd to the 115th Houses, I examine three dimensions of relationship durability: how long support is sustained, the likelihood of stopping contributions, and the likelihood of resuming support after a lapse. Seed interests support legislators for more election cycles, are 13% less likely to stop giving, and are more likely to resume contributions after lapses, with the strongest effects in open-seat races. These findings show that even under uncertainty, early giving reflects selective, investment-driven behavior rather than access-seeking.Tracing the Impact of Early Money on Committee Assignments
Under Review
Abstract
I look at whether legislators try to sit in committees whose jurisdictions are related to their seed donors’ interests. I define committee jurisdiction in two ways: (1) by examining donations to committee members in the past election cycle and (2) by identifying where bills on specific policy interests were assigned from the floor. To test whether legislators join committees aligned with their seed donors’ interests, I analyze the match rates between MCs’ seed donor interests and committee affiliations over their careers. I also run a survival model, treating placement on a seed interest-related committee as an event, and compare the time it takes for MCs to join a seed donor interest committee versus a bandwagon interest committee. I find that most legislators secure a position on a seed donor-related committee by their fourth cycle, with Republicans doing so earlier and at a higher rate than Democrats.Publications
You can also find my publications on my Google Scholar profile.