Ayoung Chun

Ayoung Chun

PhD Candidate in American Politics

Research

Dissertation (Book Project)

First to Come, Last to Leave: An Analysis on Seed Donors and Politicians

Abstract Who supports first time candidates and why? I argue that early donors to first-time candidates establish relationships with them as long-term commitments. This research examines whether donors who share policy goals with legislators and support them during their first successful primary—“seed interests”—become enduring allies throughout their careers. Analyzing donation data from the 102nd to 115th House freshman cohorts, I track seed interest contributions across multiple elections and compare them to “bandwagon interests,” which only begin supporting legislators once their viability is clear. The results show that seed interests contribute approximately $5,200 more per election cycle and are more likely to sustain their support. This effect is strongest for legislators who won their seats through open-seat primaries. Tracking donor-legislator relationships reveals that seed interest ties with open-seat primary winners last 20% longer than those with legislators who defeated incumbents. Additionally, seed interests are 5% more likely to resume contributions after periods of inactivity than bandwagon donors—equating to about 21 more returning donors and an additional $42,600 in campaign funds. Unlike bandwagon interests, whose support is often opportunistic, seed interests demonstrate greater financial consistency and resilience. However, loyalty at the political action committee (PAC) level within seed interests is conditional on electoral conditions. This research highlights the distinct dynamics of early donor-legislator relationships and the strategic behavior of seed interests, offering insights into how early investments can secure long-term influence.

From Donors to Desks: Tracing the Impact of Early Money on Committee Assignments

Abstract I look at whether legislators try to sit in committees whose jurisdictions is related to their seed donors’ interests. I define committee jurisdiction in two ways: (1) by examining donations to committee members in the past election cycle and (2) by identifying where bills on specific policy interests were assigned from the floor. To test whether legislators join committees aligned with their seed donors’ interests, I analyze the match rates between MCs’ seed donor interests and committee affiliations over their careers. I also run a survival model, treating placement on a seed interest-related committee as an event, and compare the time it takes for MCs to join a seed donor interest committee versus a bandwagon interest committee. I find that most legislators secure a position on a seed donor-related committee by their fourth cycle, with Republicans doing so earlier and at a higher rate than Democrats.

Whose Champion? Investigating Legislators’ Priorities in Committee Hearings

Abstract Whose interests do legislators advocate for in lawmaking? The literature has extensively explored the incentives shaping legislators' behavior, with particular focus on the roles of donors and constituents. This study specifically examines the influence of early donors ("seed interests") on legislators' actions during committee hearings. By analyzing transcripts from committee hearings in the 107th to 117th sessions of the House of Representatives using supervised and semi-supervised topic models, and cross-validating the results with an AI assistant, I investigate whether legislators prioritize their seed interests over those of their constituents or largest donors, especially in relation to the electoral conditions under which these relationships were formed. The findings reveal that legislators are more likely to advocate for seed donors when they secured their seat through open-seat primaries followed by non-competitive general elections. In contrast, legislators show less consistent support for seed donors when elected through more competitive routes, where they are incentivized to appeal to the broader electorate. These results highlight a new type of interest group-legislator relationship that may help explain legislators' lawmaking behavior.

Working Papers

Understanding Committee Assignment Power in State Legislatures

Abstract How important is committee assignment power in state legislatures? I argue that its effect is often overestimated in contemporary literature. While influential, removing high-leverage individuals and states yielded significantly smaller estimated effects than the findings of Fouirnaies and Hall (2018). In fact, matching and dimension reduction techniques revealed that the observed effect is more closely associated with negative agenda power, i.e., veto power.

Publications

You can also find my publications on my Google Scholar profile.